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CAN THE PENALTIES FOR TREASON CO-EXIST
WITH THE CONCEPT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY?
A BOOK REVIEW OF CHARLES YORKE’S
“SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE LAW OF
FORFEITURE, FOR HIGH TREASON”
By: Christopher Guzelian1
Charles Yorke’s book, Some Considerations on the Law of Forfei-
ture, for High Treason, is 274 years old.  Nevertheless, it has modern
relevance.  President Trump,2 prominent members of Congress (e.g.,
Senator Kamala Harris3), and Justice Brett Kavanaugh during his con-
firmation hearing (in an exchange with Senator Lindsey Graham4)
have recently discussed law related to treason.
The last treason prosecuted in the United States was in 1952.5  Trea-
son was prosecuted only in rare instances before that.  Therefore,
there is a sizeable deficit of modern United States legal understand-
ings of treason, and Yorke provides a helpful catalyst for modern
scholars to discuss the unintuitive relation between the concept of pri-
vate property and the laws of treason.
Yorke spoke to appropriate property penalties for English traitors
during the Jacobite Revolution of 1745.  He denounced the Persian
and Macedonian cultures that exacted the death penalty on the trai-
tor’s family and relations.  But Yorke used examples from Athenian,
Roman, Jewish, and feudal sources to show that personal forfeiture of
assets (in addition to the possible use of the death penalty) was an
appropriate consequence of treason.  More strikingly, Yorke did sup-
port Corruption of Blood (i.e., denial of a traitor’s right to pass inheri-
tance to heirs or to his corporation6), although others in 1700s Britain
1. Christopher Guzelian, Department of Finance and Economics, McCoy Col-
lege of Business Administration, Texas State University, guzelian@txstate.edu
2. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, (Sept. 5, 2018, 3:15
PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1037464177269514240.
3. Kamala Harris Says She Would Not Execute Someone for Committing Treason
Against the United States, CNSNEWS.COM (March 15, 2019, 3:06 PM), https://
www.cnsnews.com/news/article/cnsnewscom-staff/kamala-harris-says-she-would-not-
execute-someone-committing-treason [https://perma.cc/2WRM-MHEW].
4. Sen. Graham asks about Military Tribunals, C-SPAN, (Sept. 5 2018), https://
www.c-span.org/video/?c4747307/sen-graham-asks-military-tribunals [https://
perma.cc/UAP3-Q349] (exchange with Justice Kavanaugh regarding law of armed
conflict and military tribunals).
5. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
6. CHARLES YORKE, SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE LAW OF FORFEITURE FOR
HIGH TREASON (1748). Yorke believed that penalties for treason in corporate envi-
ronments should rightly extend beyond the wrongdoer to the entire corporation.
Yorke wrote: “In the case of a corporation; the sense of the majority, or of a chosen
number, ordinarily determines the body. On account of faults committed in their cor-
169
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had advocated for the abandonment of this principle.7  Yorke rea-
soned that the traitor had forfeited the “Protection of Society” by his
act, and thus the right to pass property to his heirs (p.9).
There is a spectrum of state property “seizures.”  They range from
the more innocuous (takings, taxes) to the more invasive (civil/crimi-
nal forfeiture) to (in Yorke’s view) absolutist (treason).8  There are
significant implications for the concept of private property and estate
law that follow from a traitor’s asset forfeiture (as Yorke puts it).   To
wit, logical reasoning yields the following two possibilities (marked A
and B below):
(A) If it is legitimate for the State to repossess private property
ranging in scope from takings to treason (basically covering the whole
scope of man’s actions—from mere existence (taxes like Obamacare)
to committing the ultimate sin against the State (treason)), it means
there really is no such thing as private property completely off limits
to the State’s acquisition.  Instead, all property is communal and an
“owner” is really more a State-permitted steward of property who can
have his stewardship taken away by the State if (1) the State needs to
take the property “back” (takings,9 taxes) or (2) the property owner
abuses the State’s laws (in varying degrees based on the level of abuse
committed—civil forfeiture,10 criminal forfeiture, treason).
porate capacity, their markets, gates fortifications, harbors, are liable to forfeiture;
and yet many innocent members may suffer the effect of such forfeiture.” Id. at 8. The
implications are significant. For instance, if a traitor used corporate mechanisms to
transfer funds to enemies of State, or to use the corporation’s proprietary information
technology to assist in spying on the State or the citizenry, could Yorke’s legal argu-
ments condemn the corporation—even if most owners, shareholders, or employees of
the corporation were unaware of the treason—to asset forfeiture, either partially or
entirely, at the State’s sole discretion.
7. Yorke acknowledged Calv. Lex. Jurid., which maintained the popular English
jurisprudential sentiment of the time that: “[Corruption of Blood] is a preposterous
fiction, which tends to the ruin of families by putting their estates, for the fault of one
ancestor, into the Power of the Crown.” Id. at 35–36. Yorke responded, “let not then
the materials of this noble fabric [of Corruption of Blood], designed by the Wisdom,
and erected, at infinite hazard by the bravery of our ancestors, become the object of
aversion and hatred, or be held in dishonor and contempt.” Id. at 38. Moreover, he
observed, “the great lawyers of the [British] Kingdom, men wisely and conscientiously
zealous for national rights, have expressed the highest veneration for the law of trea-
son established in England and seem more concerned for the certainty of it than to
lessen the severity.” Id. at 66.
8. While Yorke’s historical review is highly instructive, it is important to note that
the law of treason in the United States stems solely from the U.S. Constitution. See
Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 741 (“The source of the law of treason is the Constitution.”).
There may therefore be limitations based on U.S. Constitutional law that reduce
Yorke’s broad scope of historical penalties for treason.
9. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005) (recognizing
private economic development to be a “public use” allowing for government takings).
10. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S.Ct. 682, 689–90 (2019) (citing Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602, that punitive civil forfeitures violate the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Constitution).
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(B) If instead there truly is such a thing as absolutely private prop-
erty as most libertarians (and some conservatives) insist, then the
State’s legal controls over that private property—ranging from takings
to taxes to forfeiture to treason—are unlawful and immoral exercises
of power.11  Under this view, penalties for treason should not reach
any and all private properties.  (Certainly not those properties previ-
ously given to heirs).  If private property can be absolute, then
Yorke’s claim that the State has virtually unlimited powers over pri-
vate property as revealed through the historical laws of treason means
reconsidering the State; it does not have (and should not have) power
over everything, and perhaps even anything. (Extreme libertarians say
a powerless State is a good thing12).
As stated above, Yorke’s inquiry into the history of treason law
demonstrates that the State traditionally has unlimited power over
private property of not just the traitor, but also the traitor’s family and
community.13  This leads to the above split in how one can view the
relationship between the State and property: one can either (1) reject
that the State has any legitimate power over private property, or
(2) claim that the State has uncontestable power over all property,
and references to “private property” are simply a mask for what all
“private” property really is: a loan from the State based on good citi-
zenship and the State’s current needs.
Yorke’s take on the laws of treason seems to suggest that there is no
middle ground between these positions.  Property is either all private
or all public.  The fact that there are people who believe each possibil-
ity is what leads to the unending conflicts about property and who
should have it.  More significantly, this statist/libertarian dichotomy
suggests one cannot maintain both a concept of private property and
the historically understood penalties for treason.
Furthermore, if, as Yorke believed, the State’s power over property
is limitless after conviction for treason, there is an incentive for pri-
vate citizens to enter government service so as to acquire their own
private property derived from the State’s plunder (legal or illegal) of
others’ private property, and then (as government officials) to hold
themselves exempt from prosecution for treason or other crimes.14 In
11. See, e.g., MURRAY ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE 1056 (2d ed.
1993) (“[A] truly free market is totally incompatible with the existence of a State, an
institution that presumes to ‘defend’ person and property by itself subsisting on [ ]
unilateral coercion against private property.”).
12. See generally.
13. Yorke acknowledged the possibility that the Crown may return, at its sole dis-
cretion, some or all of a traitor’s estate to his heirs, YORKE, supra note 5, at 46, but
that Corruption of Blood in most circumstances can only be removed by an Act of
Parliament, id. at 60.
14. Yorke did observe that in English feudal law, Lords who abused their privilege
over their vassals were stripped of power, title, and resources. He wrote, “If the Lord
proved guilty of injustice or oppression, his seigniory was forfeited . . . and the Tenant
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other words, under Yorke’s views on treason and property, the rise of
an unconstitutional, legally immune kleptocracy is likely.  Some peo-
ple refer to this phenomenon as the “Deep State.”15
However, there is a happier third possibility that possibly eliminates
the need to choose between abandoning age-old conceptions of either
private property or laws of treason.  Namely, private people and cor-
porations, as well as government officials in their private capacities,
should forgive perceived State abuses of their “private property” by
not resisting the State, and State officials should voluntarily limit both
the scope of government’s reach over “private property” and the ex-
tent of penalties exacted for treason and other crimes as not to be
abusive.  But this happier approach requires private forgiveness and
government restraint.
Indeed, the Founders in their wisdom seemed to recognize that
there is such a thing as absolutely private property that government
must respect. The Constitution prohibits post mortem Corruption of
Blood.16 Therefore, the document expressly rejects Yorke’s view that
there should be an unlimited property penalty for treason. Rather, its
rejection of post mortem Corruption of Blood implicitly advances the
concept of absolutely private property over the power of the State. We
should be mindful of the honor the Founders gave to the concept of
absolutely private property – specifically that property bestowed via
inheritance on a treasonist’s heirs after death – enshrined in the Cor-
ruption of Blood clause during this conflicted time in which accusa-
tions of treason are now widely manifest.
Yorke’s wide-canvassing book provides excellent grist for a modern
society that once again is discussing the laws and penalties of treason.
was to transfer his fealty to the Lord next above him, or to the Prince, as the supreme
guardian.” Id. at 30.
15. See generally, MIKE LOFGREN, THE DEEP STATE: THE FALL OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND THE RISE OF A SHADOW GOVERNMENT (2016).
16. See U.S. Constitution, Art. 3 Sec. 3, para. 2. (“The Congress shall have power
to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corrup-
tion of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.”)
